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Abstract 
We investigate whether firms’ economic and financial situation influence 
the Quality of their Financial Reports (FRQ). FRQ is fundamental for investors 
and it affects the international capital movements [Bradshaw et al. (2004)] and 
Gelos and Wei (2005)]. Following Schipper and Vicent (2003) we use two 
issues to access earnings quality: abnormal accruals and earnings persistence. 
For seventeen European countries, we find evidence that the economic 
performance affects FRQ. Big firms and those with high current earnings exhibit 
better financial information. These results are robust since they don’t depend on 
FRQ proxy and we have the same evidence when we estimate regression with 
economical and financial factors separately or together. About financial 
situation, it seems not to affect FRQ. However, in high leveraged firms, the 
capital structure becomes determinant. 
 
JEL classification: L25 and G32. 
 
Key words: Financial Report Quality; Firm Performance; Capital Structure; 
Abnormal Accruals. 
 
Introduction 
 
We analyse whether firm’s economic and financial performance affect 
Quality of their Financial Reports (FRQ). 
Financial Reports are used by several economic agents in their decision- 
making processes. Investors decide whether to purchase a firm’s capital by 
analysing its financial reports as Fields et al. (2001) wrote since the capital 
market is not efficient in a strong way. Even in international capital movements, 
the financial reports are crucial [Bradshow et al. (2004) and Gelos and Wey 
(2005)]. 
Creditors decide to lend or not and they establish contractual conditions, 
namely interest rates, considering accounting numbers, as shown by 
Gopalakrishan (1994) and Betty and Weber (2003).  
Schipper and Vicent (2003) also emphasised the usefulness of financial 
reporting and underlined that Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
Conceptual Framework has included it in Concepts Statement no. 1, para.34 and 
following. 
The selection of financial techniques is a very important question since it 
determines the income statement, the balance sheet, the cash flow map and 
appendixes. Accounting choice may not be neutral since Financial Techniques 
can be selected in a way that increases/decreases firm income. 
In literature, several methodologies have been developed to investigate 
earnings quality: a) accounting choice followed by Bradshow et al. (2004) and 
Astami and Tower (2006). This consists of creating a ratio from the manager’s 
accounting choice in a way that allows conformity with the Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) to be analysed; b) income increasing/ 
decreasing using a binary dependent variable and a logit model as Christy and 
Zimmerman (1994) and Betty and Weber (2003) did; c) abnormal accruals are 
the residuals from a regression of total accruals depending on investments and 
sales. This methodology was introduced by Jones (1991) and modified Jones by 
Dechow et al. (1995); d) accruals map cash from Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
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and Schipper and Vicent (2003). The assumption is that a high quality accrual is 
eventually realised as cash flow. Abnormal Accrual driven from errors in 
estimation or earning management will not turn into cash; e) and finally 
earnings persistence referred to by Shipper and Vicent (2003) and Dermerjian 
et al. (2006). This approach consists of estimating a regression of earnings as a 
function of past earnings.  
In this work, we use abnormal accruals methodology for two reasons: a) 
data collection reasons, since we do not have the accounting choice database and 
because some countries in the sample did not issue cash flows in the period 
considered; b) abnormal accruals have been intensively used for a time which 
means this methodology is preferable to others. 
In addition, FRQ is also estimated by earnings persistence methodology. 
Again it was chosen because it was possible to obtain data from Worldscope. 
With this second regression, we aim to test the robustness of results. In other 
words, we want to examine whether results are not driven by the quality of the 
estimative used for FRQ. 
Intensive research has been done to investigate what factors affect 
earnings quality as Fields et al. (2001) wrote. Financial information quality will 
be more accurate if we understand the managers’ motivations and their influence 
on firm performance. These authors emphasise the importance of regulating 
managers’ behaviour, but notice the impossibility of eliminating the existence of 
accounting choices. Thus, many studies have been developed and there is one 
consensual question - there are several factors that influence manager behaviour.  
This work’s contributions consist of analysing whether economic and 
financial factors are relevant to FRQ for a large sample of European countries 
(seventeen) and industries (forty) and it also includes a long period of seventeen 
years. Second, we investigate whether those factors are significant, or not, 
regardless of the way FRQ is estimated. For that purpose, we use two issues: 
abnormal accruals and earnings persistence. Finally, we investigate whether 
making a time series or cross sectional analysis changes the relation between 
these two sets of variables and FRQ. 
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. In the first section, we 
have the definition of the hypotheses to test. We identify the data and 
methodology used in the empirical work. Several statistics are included and the 
econometric models are defined. In the second section, we show the evidence 
found in the empirical tests, which are then analysed. Some tests are done to 
verify the robustness of the results in order to assure that they are not driven by 
some statistical problems. In the last section, some conclusions are drawn from 
the results obtained.  
 
Section 1: Methodology, Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
 
In this section, three null hypotheses are defined which are going to be 
tested in section 2. Then we have the models used and their variables definitions. 
Finally, there is the sample characterization, namely some statistics are analysed. 
 
1.1. Methodology 
1.1.1. Hypotheses to test 
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We want to analyse whether the economic situation of firms affects FRQ. 
Big firms have social pressures and higher taxes to pay [Watts and Zimmerman 
(1978)]. Thus, these firms make the accounting procedures definitions in such a 
way as to reduce those pressures. Gopalakrishnan (1994) found that to avoid 
political costs firms above a certain size (measured by the log of sales) made 
income-decreasing choices. More recent works found that huge firms and those 
with good performances are pressured to improve their FRQ [Demerjian et al. 
(2006) and Bradshaw et al. (2004)]. Big firms have the best accounting service, 
audited by a BIG4 and controlled by the most developed financial market when 
they issue an ADR list. However, Astami and Tower (2006) found evidence that 
size was not significant in accounting choice in some Asian Countries. These 
contradictions motivated us to test the following hypothesis with equations (1) 
and (2): 
 
H0.1: Financial Report Quality does not depend on the firm’s economic 
conditions. 
( )itit factorseconomicalAAA 21 αα +=                                                                (1) 
 






++= ititit factorseconomicalEarnFE 321 βββ                                                (2) 
 
 
Where, AA means abnormal accruals and FE is future earnings. They are 
used to assess FRQ. 
In terms of financial structure, Astami and Tower (2006) found that firms 
with lower leverage are more likely to choose income- increase accounting 
techniques. This is not consistent with the literature since firms exhibiting high 
leverage tend to increase income. Betty and Weber (2003) analysed the effects 
of debt contracts details and found that debt contracting is an important 
consideration in managers’ decisions to change accounting methods. Managers 
are more likely to make income-increasing accounting choices when debt 
contracting calculations are affected. Gopalakrishnan’s (1994) results suggest 
that even when firms do not have long- term debt, in order to avoid debt 
covenant constraints, managers will choose straight- line depreciation methods 
and they will choose FIFO as the inventory method. Therefore, we expect that 
firms with higher debt to equity ratio have incentives to increase earnings 
reported, meaning that they exhibit poor FRQ.  
We also consider ADR as a financial factor because it represented to 
obtain investments issuing stocks in a developed market. Its relation with FRQ is 
positive since this market has a monitoring effect under financial information 
[Bradshaw et al. (2004) and Mitton (2002)]. 
Then we have the second null hypothesis using equations (3) and (4). 
 
H0.2: The Financial Report Quality does not depend on firm financial 
conditions. 
( )itit factorsfinancialAAA 31 αα +=                                                                                 (3) 
 






++= ititit factorsfinancialEarnFE 321 βββ                                                   (4) 
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In a third hypothesis, we investigate the robustness of our results since 
the economic and financial factors produce opposite effects on earnings: 
economic is positively related and financial is negatively. In both cases we have 
less FRQ. Considering these factors together, we analyse whether there is any 
significant change.  
In addition, we include some control variables. La Porta et al. (2000) 
draw attention to the theory of external investors’ protection, namely in terms of 
the quality of financial information. They referred to the relevance of the 
existing law in each country to assure better Financial Reports and contribute not 
only to more valuable firms (higher Q-Tobin) but also to more developed 
financial markets. Mitton (2002) investigated the relation between some East 
Asian firm’s performance and their corporate governance. This author stated that 
higher financial quality can be assessed by the existence of an ADR and the 
existence of one of the BIG62 audit firms. Bradshaw et al. (2004) also noticed 
that the quality of Financial Reports is an important question and showed that 
American institutional investors preferred firms placed in countries in which 
accounting standards were closer to the Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles (GAAP). Their results also showed that investors apply higher 
amounts in firms with an ADR list and issue for a longer time; they prefer firms 
with higher ROE and leverage and those audited by a BIG5. 
We have the third hypothesis and equations (5) and (6): 
 
H0.3: The Financial Report Quality does not depend on firm economical 
nor financial conditions. 
 
( ) ( ) ( )itititit governancecorporatefactorsfinancialfactorseconomicalAA 4321 αααα +++=
(5) 
 
( ) ( )
( )it
itititit
governancecorporate
factorsfinancialfactorseconomicalEarnFE
5
43211
β
ββββ ++++=+
 
(6) 
 
1.1.2. Econometric models and variables definitions 
 
The FRQ determinants are estimated using two models: in the first one 
we estimate Abnormal Accruals (AA) and in the second we have earnings 
persistence as dependent variable. 
 
Model A 
itititititititititit LawBigADRDESLSGROASizeAAA εααααααααα +++++++++= 987654321 4  
 
Where: 
itAAA : Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals; 
itSize :  Log of total assets of firm i at year t (total assets-key item- 
                                               
2 The six international audit firms are: Arthur Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & Young, 
KPMG, Pricewaterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand. Then after a market consolidation they 
become five and now they are four: Deloitte & Touche, Ernest & Young, KPMG, and 
Pricewaterhousecoopers. 
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wc02999); 
itROA :  Return on assets (wc08326); 
itSG : Sales growth of firm i from year t-1 to t (growth of net sales or 
revenues-wc01001); 
itSL : Sales per employee (wc01001 and wc07011); 
itDE : Total debt to common equity (wc08231); 
itADR : Dummy=1 when firm i issues the American Depository Receipt 
at year t and 0 otherwise (wc06110); 
itBig4 : Dummy=1 when firm i is audited by one of the biggest and 
international auditing firms at year t and 0 otherwise 
(wc07800); 
itLaw : Dummy=1 when firm i has common legal origin; 
itε : Error term for firm i at year t. 
 
 In this model, as in prior research, the Absolute Value of Abnormal 
Accruals (AAA) is a proxy of earnings quality [e.g. Larcker and Richardson 
(2004) and Warfield et al. (1995)], which are estimated by total accruals using 
the cross-sectional modified Jones indicated by Dechow (1995).  
 We first computed Total Accrual (TA) by balance sheet approach since 
some countries do not disclose cash flow for all the period considered using 
equation (7): 
 
TA = ∆ Rec + ∆ Inv + ∆ OCA - ∆ AP – Dep                                                      (7) 
 
Where: 
∆ Rec: Change in receivables (wc02051); 
∆ Inv: Change in inventories (wc02101); 
∆ OCA: Change in other current assets (wc02149); 
∆ AP: Change in accounts payables (wc03040); 
Dep: Depreciation and amortization (wc01151). 
 
We estimate the equation (8) to get the Abnormal Accruals (AA) by 
residuals. We have 400 regressions (40 industries in a 10/year period).  The 
number of observations is different per industry but with a minimum of 9 
observations (firms per year). This approach assumes that AA is homogeneous 
in each industry as referred by Larcker and Richardson (2004). 
The AA is the part that is not explained by the regression (8): 
 
( ) itit3itit21it uPPEα∆Rec∆SalααTA ++−+=                                              (8) 
 
Where: 
itTA  Total Accruals computed by equation (7); 
it∆Sal : Change in sales for firm i between year t and t-1 (wc01001); 
it∆Rec : Change in receivables for firm i between year t and t-1 (wc02051); 
itPPE : Property, plant and equipment- gross for firm i at year t (wc02301); 
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itu : Error term for firm i at year t. 
  
Therefore, in this model it is assumed that changes in revenues less 
changes in receivables, as well as capital intensity create normal accruals. The 
credit sales are supposed to be abnormal. 
All variables are scaled by mean of total assets in the end of the current 
year and in the end of the previous year. This is to reduce heteroskedasticity 
problems since the sample includes firms with very different sizes. 
Nevertheless the improvements, accruals are still incomplete since 
subsists imprecision associated to classification of normal and abnormal accruals 
as Phillips et al. (2003), Larcker and Richardson (2004) wrote. Several 
developments introduce more variables into Total Accruals regression to explain 
the accruals that emerge from the normal activity of firms such as cash flow and 
return on assets. However, the model suggested by Dechow (1995) is still the 
most accurate. 
An important issue is that the abnormal accruals are analysed by their 
absolute value. We don’t aim to analyse abnormal accruals sign (positive or negative) 
but its total amount. The highest absolute value of AA is the less quality Financial 
Information has. 
 
Model B 
tit
ititititititittitit
Law
BigADRDESLSGROASizeETFE
εβ
βββββββββ
+
+++++++++=+
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 In this model, Earning Persistence (EP) is a proxy of earnings quality 
(e.g. Shipper and Vicent (2003) and Dermerjian et al. (2006). 
EP is estimated by the parameter of earnings before extra items in current 
year (ET- wc01551). If this is statistically significant, Future Earnings (FE), 
which is earnings before extra items at year t+1, depends on ET.  
The other variables definitions are the same as model A. 
For all countries, these variables were in Euros. Therefore we could not 
use local currency for five countries: Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom. 
 
1.2. Sample and Descriptive Statistics 
1.2.1. Sample 
 
Our sample has got 1,406 firms and 9 years this means a total of 12,654 
firms-years observations. We only consider firms that have accounting 
information available in Worldscope for seventeen European countries and for 
all years considered, that is, from 1997 to 2006. We use cross- sectional 
approach. First we have 1,490 firms with 14,900 firms-years observations.  
However, firms with SIC code 6000 to 6999 were excluded since 
Financial Institutions have specific regulations. It reduces the sample to 1,477 
firms.  
We also excluded firms in industries with fewer than 9 firms. That 
reduces our sample to 1,406 firms and 40 industries.  
We collected data for 2006 but we miss this year to obtain Earnings 
Persistence, since we must have earnings in the next year. 
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1.2.2. Descriptive statistics  
 
The United Kingdom (UK) is the most represented on the sample, with 
nearly 31% of the total sample. This is the only country that has firms in all 
industries considered except in two- digits SIC code no. 16 (Building- Heavy). 
France has the second and Germany the third highest number of firms. Together 
they represent nearly 26% of the total firms considered.  
The least represented is Luxembourg with just four firms, followed by 
Portugal with less than 1% of total sample firms (with 13 firms).  
In our sample, the number of firms located on countries from code law 
origin is bigger than the number of firms from common law (68% from the 17 
countries considered less UK and Ireland).  
The industry with more firms is SIC code 35 (Industrial) with 6.7% of 
total. But there are several industries around 6% as SIC code 73 (Business 
Services), 28 (Chemicals) and 20 (Food).  
The industries with fewest firms are SIC code 29 (Petroleum) with the 
minimum to be considered (nine firms) and SIC code 39 (Manufacturing) with 
10 firms.  
We can get this information form table 1. 
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Table 1: 
Number of firms per country and industries in cross- sectional sample  
SIC2 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemb. NL Norway Portugal Spain Sweden Swiss UK Total 
Industry 
% of 
total 
13 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 9 16 1.1 
15 5 1 1 2 3 3 0 2 0 0 2 0 3 0 1 0 20 43 3.1 
16 0 0 2 0 4 3 5 3 0 0 3 0 0 7 1 0 0 28 2.0 
17 1 0 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 7 15 1.1 
20 4 7 5 6 15 12 5 4 0 2 6 0 1 2 1 7 15 92 6.5 
22 1 0 1 0 3 1 1 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5 23 1.6 
23 0 0 0 2 1 9 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 4 19 1.4 
25 0 0 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 11 0.8 
26 2 0 1 9 2 2 0 0 3 0 1 2 2 1 6 1 3 35 2.5 
27 0 0 1 2 1 1 0 2 6 0 5 2 0 0 1 3 12 36 2.6 
28 1 2 5 1 13 19 2 1 5 0 4 0 0 2 0 6 31 92 6.5 
29 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 2 9 0.6 
30 1 4 0 2 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 6 22 1.6 
32 4 0 5 0 5 13 2 3 4 0 1 0 1 2 0 2 11 53 3.8 
33 2 3 0 1 2 1 6 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 1 5 8 37 2.6 
34 0 0 0 3 6 2 2 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 3 4 13 37 2.6 
35 0 1 1 4 8 26 1 0 3 0 4 2 0 0 9 16 19 94 6.7 
36 1 2 3 4 14 14 0 0 5 0 3 1 0 2 4 7 24 84 6.0 
37 1 2 0 0 8 12 0 0 11 0 1 0 0 3 7 1 9 55 3.9 
38 0 0 2 1 5 5 0 0 5 0 1 1 0 0 3 6 19 48 3.4 
39 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 12 0.9 
42 0 0 1 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 0.7 
44 0 1 1 3 0 2 1 1 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 1 4 18 1.3 
45 2 0 1 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 14 1.0 
47 0 0 1 0 1 2 1 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 4 15 1.1 
48 0 2 1 0 6 1 1 0 4 1 2 0 1 2 4 2 7 34 2.4 
49 2 2 0 2 7 6 0 0 2 1 0 2 1 5 0 5 14 49 3.5 
50 0 1 6 3 11 7 5 1 0 0 5 1 0 2 5 6 27 80 5.7 
51 2 1 3 1 14 15 3 2 1 0 2 2 0 3 0 4 6 59 4.2 
53 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 5 12 0.9 
54 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 3 0 2 0 0 1 3 16 1.1 
55 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 3 0 5 10 0.7 
56 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 1 8 14 1.0 
58 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 10 15 1.1 
59 0 1 0 0 3 3 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 16 1.1 
70 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 1 7 18 1.3 
73 0 1 2 0 9 7 1 0 3 0 6 1 0 1 9 6 46 92 6.5 
79 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 8 17 1.2 
80 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 11 0.8 
87 0 0 4 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 0 0 2 0 29 45 3.2 
Total 
Country 30 33 49 53 181 184 41 22 76 4 68 23 13 44 66 92 427 1406 100.0 
% of total 2.1 2.3 3.5 3.8 12.9 13.1 2.9 1.6 5.4 0.3 4.8 1.6 0.9 3.1 4.7 6.5 30.4 100   
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In table 2, we have the two-digit SIC code industries and the mean 
absolute value of AA per industry. Buildings have highest average amount of 
AA in the average total assets, over 8%.  
The first and second most represented industries (SIC code 35- 
Engineering, Accounting and Management and 73- Business Services) have high 
levels of Absolute Abnormal Value of Accruals, with close to 6.7% and 8% of 
Total Assets respectively, in mean. 
The industries with fewest AA are air and water transport, with about 
2%. 
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Table 2: 
Industry denomination and each absolute value of Abnormal Accruals 
(AAA) 
SIC2 Industry AAA 
13 Oil & Gas 0.048364655 
15 Building- Light 0.084022459 
16 Building- Heavy 0.074996399 
17 Construction 0.053132166 
20 Food 0.049722951 
22 Textile mill 0.041374786 
23 Apparel 0.049965843 
25 Furniture 0.061007529 
26 Paper 0.03154976 
27 Printing 0.033504601 
28 Chemicals 0.045037408 
29 Petroleum 0.022230844 
30 Rubber 0.037141488 
32 Stone 0.042937747 
33 Metal Work- Basic 0.049609058 
34 Metal Work- Fabrication 0.039247411 
35 Industrial 0.066969671 
36 Electrical 0.065500408 
37 Transport Equipment 0.049874877 
38 Instruments 0.04653678 
39 Misc. Manufacturing 0.049078812 
42 Motor Freight 0.040155187 
44 Water Transport 0.027941279 
45 Air Transport 0.022271353 
47 Transport Services 0.050448316 
48 Communications 0.050084184 
49 Utilities 0.033087356 
50 Durables- Wholesale 0.062722744 
51 Non Durables- Wholesale 0.053159494 
53 General Stores 0.029425799 
54 Food Stores 0.025833165 
55 Auto Dealers 0.049041197 
56 Apparel Retail 0.054097932 
58 Eating 0.023159576 
59 Misc. Retail 0.045700191 
70 Hotels 0.037618876 
73 Business Services 0.079249074 
79 Amusement & Recreation Services 0.048993939 
80 Health Services 0.04029709 
87 
Engineering, Accounting &Management 
Services 0.07194476 
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As expected, the mean of the Abnormal Accruals (AA) is close to zero. 
As we use the absolute value of AA (AAA), it represents 5.24% of the average 
total assets, as we can see in table 3.  
The mean of earnings before extra items is 3.2% of the average total 
assets and firms’ size is about €520,528.00. The mean of sales growth is about 
27% and the sales of each employee is close to €241.00. But there is a high 
standard deviation, therefore firms’ productivity changes dramatically within 
firms. In mean, debt is 72% of common equity. But the highest standard 
deviation can be seen in debt to equity. This can indicate that there are some 
highly leveraged firms and others that are not. Moreover, there are some firms 
with a negative equity. 
 
Table 3: 
Descriptive statistics 
  AA AAA FE ET SIZE ROA SG SL DE 
 Mean 0.0000 0.0524 0.0323 0.0330 13.1626 5.8814 0.2705 240.8234 72.1958 
 Median 0.0007 0.0337 0.0411 0.0413 12.9674 5.9000 0.0570 167.9758 55.5700 
 
Maximum 0.9291 0.9877 0.7880 0.7880 19.4289 996.2900 1162.2390 5837.3000 37501.9200 
 Minimum -0.9877 0.0000 -3.8462 -3.8462 4.5539 -1251.1800 -1.0000 0,2011 
-
93200.0000 
 Std. Dev. 0.0820 0.0631 0.1312 0.1310 2.0056 29.3649 10.9803 309.6058 1492.8010 
Obs. 12,654 12,654 12,456 12,455 12,456 12,598 12,639 12,345 12,651 
Variables definitions: AAA is the absolute value of AA and this is abnormal accruals and 
consists of residuals of regression estimation: ( ) i321i uPPEαes∆receivabl∆salesααTA ++−+= . TA is 
Total Accruals and is obtained by changes in receivables (wc02051) plus change in inventories 
(wc02101) and change in other current assets (wc02149) less changes in accounts payables 
(wc03040) and less depreciation (wc01151). All variables from this model are scaled by the 
average of total assets (wc02999). FE is earnings in the next year. ET is earnings before 
extraordinary items at year t (wc01551). Both variables are scaled by average of total assets 
(wc02999). Size is the natural logarithm of total assets (wc02999). ROA is returns on assets 
(wc08326). SG is sales growth computed by sales of current year to sales of previous year 
(wc01001). SL is labour productivity and consists of ratio between sales and number of 
employees (wc01001 and wc07011). Finally, DE is Debt to Equity and is defined as total debt to 
common equity (wc08231). 
 
The correlations between dependent and independent variables are low. 
The exception is the correlation between FE and ET which is close to 60%. The 
correlations between economic variables and FRQ proxies are stronger than the 
correlations between financial variables and FRQ.  
There is a strong correlation between control variables BIG4/Size and 
Law/Size with 26% and 23%, respectively. The strongest correlation is between 
ADR and Size, almost 50%. These can be confirmed in tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4: 
Correlation with AAA dependent variable 
  AAA SIZE ROA SG SL DE ADR BIG4 LAW 
AAA 1.0000 
SIZE -0.1738 1.0000 
ROA -0.0588 0.0690 1.0000 
SG -0.0044 -0.0078 -0.0007 1.0000 
SL 0.0272 0.1266 0.0302 0.0081 1.0000 
DE 0.0085 0.0150 0.0860 0.0003 0.0056 1.0000 
ADR -0.0833 0.4891 0.0230 -0.0048 0.0677 0.0152 1.0000 
BIG4 -0.0748 0.2629 0.0602 0.0082 0.0234 0.0010 0.1426 1.0000 
LAW -0.0226 0.2332 0.0236 0.0027 0.0497 0.0053 -0.0238 -0.0751 1.0000 
Variables definitions are in Table 3. 
 
Table 5: 
Correlation with EP dependent variable 
  FE ET SIZE ROA SG SL DE ADR BIG4 LAW 
FE 1.0000 
ET 0.5957 1.0000 
SIZE 0.1009 0.1115 1.0000 
ROA 0.2954 0.5188 0.0693 1.0000 
SL -0.0263 -0.0198 -0.0078 -0.0007 1.0000 
SG 0.0706 0.0742 0.1267 0.0301 0.0081 1.0000 
DE -0.0068 -0.0050 0.0150 0.0861 0.0003 0.0056 1.0000 
ADR 0.0069 0.0011 0.4892 0.0229 -0.0048 0.0677 0.0152 1.0000 
BIG4 0.0821 0.0806 0.2628 0.0604 0.0082 0.0234 0.0010 0.1426 1.0000 
LAW 0.0689 0.0577 0.2332 0.0238 0.0027 0.0497 0.0053 -0.0238 -0.0752 1.0000 
Variables definitions are in Table 4. 
 
Section 2: Empirical results 
 
In the models estimations, we use unbalanced data panel. This enables us 
to consider differences by including several years and firms. This technique 
substitutes the missing variables and increases the efficiency of estimated 
coefficients (Soares and Stark, 2008).  
Data panel is unbalanced because some variables do not have values in 
certain years. Panel data is estimated with cross-section and period fixed effects, 
i.e. with dummy variables for firms and years. When we introduce dummies to 
ADR, BIG4 and Law, we can have just period fixed effects. Therefore, in order 
to test the second hypothesis, the panel data is estimated with just period fixed 
effects, because dummy variables for firms and dummy for ADR list produce the 
problem of a singular matrix. The same problem arises in third hypothesis. 
 
2.1. Two models to test FRQ determinants 
 
As it was explained on section 1, we use two proxies to access earning 
quality: AAA (absolute value of Abnormal Accruals) and EP (Earnings 
Persistence). In both cases, we test the three hypotheses defined above.  
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R-squared adjusted in EP (Model B) is higher than in AAA (Model A) 
for the three hypotheses. Model B more readily explains FRQ because the 
independent variable of earnings before extraordinary items in the current year is 
statistically significant and its sign is positive, as expected, for all hypotheses. 
For the first hypothesis (impact of economical factors on FRQ), in model 
A, the economic variable Size is statistically significant and its sign is in 
accordance with the sign expected because big firms are expected to use less AA 
(see table 6). We have the same results when we include several factors such as 
financial and control (see table 8). In model B, Size is also statistically 
significant (at 1% level) but it has opposite sign when we test just the economic 
factors and it is in accordance with the sign expected when we estimated with all 
factors. Big firms are expected to report all the earnings obtained (see table 6 
and 8).  
The sign of ROA is negative and it is as expected, less in model B when 
all factors are included. It is statistically significant at 1% level in all 
estimations, except for economic factors in model B. 
For sales growth, we have evidence that it is not significant and sign is 
irregular in both models. Labour productivity is significant and its effect on 
AAA is positive thus it is opposite from the predicted one since firms with 
higher performance tend to use less abnormal Accruals (AA). In EP, Labour 
productivity is significant and its sign is positive as predicted (see tables 6 and 
8). Nevertheless, these two variables produce a very little effect on the dependent 
variable (coefficient close to zero). 
 
Table 6: 
H01- Economic determinants of FRQ using AAA (absolute value of 
Abnormal Accruals) and EP (Earning Persistence) as dependent variable 
Model A (AAA)   Model B (EP) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.  Predicted  Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) Sign  (OLS t-statistic) 
Intercept 
 
0.1609 *   0.3847 * 
(7.9626)   (12.0998) 
ET .. 
 
+ 
 
0.2857 * 
 
 (27.6784) 
Size - -0.0084 * +  -0.0277 * 
(-5.5001)   (-11.4548) 
 ROA - -5.05E-05 * +  0.0000 
(-2.5430)   (-0.2217) 
SG - -4.45E-05 +  -0.0001 
 (-0.9151)   (-1.2517) 
SL - 1.15E-05 * +  1.44E-05 * 
    (3.4781)      (2.7707)   
Number of obs. 12,287   12,286 
Adj. R-squared   0.1901      0.4526   
Variables are defined as follows: ET consists of earnings before extra items in current year 
(wc01551); Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s total assets (wc02999); ROA is return on 
assets (wc08326); SG is sales growth and it is computed by sales of current year to sales of 
previous year -1 (wc01001); and SL is sales of current year per employee (wc01001 and 
wc07011). 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
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For the second hypothesis (impact of financial factors on FRQ), DE (debt to 
equity) is statistically significant at 10% level just when we consider all 
independent variables in model A. In other words, it has no significance in 
model B neither in model A with the financial factors. The sign is positive as 
expected in model A because higher debt means to have more AA (less 
information quality). The sign is negative and opposite from predicted in model 
B since higher debt means higher earnings to increase contractual power. The 
impact of this variable on FRQ is very small (coefficient close to zero). See table 
7 and 8. 
For the other financial factor considered the results are not consistent. 
The ADR variable has signs as predicted when we only consider financial 
variables (negative for model A and positive for model B because this market 
asks for high information quality). ADR is just statistically significant for model 
A which has got a small power to explain AAA (less than one percent as we can 
see on table 7). When we include all variables, ADR sign is the opposite of that 
expected in both models and, once again, it is just statistically significant in 
model A (see table 8). 
 
Table 7: 
H02- Financial determinants of FRQ using AAA and EP as dependent 
variable 
Model A (AAA)   Model B (EP) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.  Predicted  Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) Sign  (OLS t-statistic) 
Intercept 0.054414 *  0.0118 * 
 
(90.48287) 
 
 (11.5334) 
 ET .. + 0.6150 * 
 (86.6672) 
DE + 3.44E-07 
 
+ -2.48E-07 
 (0.921652)  (-0.4037) 
ADR - -0.014523 * + 0.0010 
 
  
  (-9.023772)     (0.3658)   
Number of obs. 
 
12,651 
 
 12,452 
 Adj. R-squared   0.011468    0.381772   
Variables are defined as follows:  ET consists of earnings before extra items in current year 
(wc01551); DE is debt to Equity given by total debt to common equity (wc08231); ADR is a 
dummy = 1 if firm has got an ADR list and zero otherwise (wc06110).  
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
The specific factors included on third hypothesis are the control variables 
(or corporate governance) Big4 and Law. 
For the two models, Big4 is statistically significant and with the 
predicted sign: firms audited by one Big4 have fewer AAA and they report the 
right earnings even if they are high, since these firms have the best audit services 
(see table 8). 
Law has the opposite sign from the expected in model A since less AAA 
were expected in Common law which legal system protects more investors and 
then firms report the right earnings. In model B sign is positive as predicted. In 
both situations Law is statistically significant at 1% level (see table 8). 
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Table 8: 
H03- Economical and Financial determinants of FRQ using AAA and EP as 
dependent variable 
Model A (AAA)   Model B (EP) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.  Predicted  Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) Sign 
 (OLS t-
statistic) 
Intercept 0.1239 *  -0.0200 * 
(29.7609)  (-3.0808) 
ET .. + 0.6098 * 
 
 
 
 (69.6995) 
 Size - -0.0055 * + 0.0015 * 
(-15.7133)  (2.6947) 
ROA - -0.0001 * + -0.0001 * 
(-5.6658)  (-2.4453) 
SG - 0.0000 ** + -0.0002 ** 
 
(-0.7349) 
 
 (-2.1042) 
 SL - 0.0000 * + 0.0000 * 
(5.8401)  (3.0687) 
DE + 3.86E-07 * + -1.73E-07 
 
 
(1.6590) 
 
 (-0.3020) 
 ADR - 0.0006 * + -0.0037 
(0.3188)  (-1.2741) 
Big4 - -0.0039 * + 0.0091 * 
(-2.8789)  (4.2677) 
Law - 0.0020 * + 0.0078 * 
    (1.5535)     (3.9727)   
Number of obs. 12,284  12,283   
Adj. R-squared 0.040425  0.3650    
Variables are defined as follows: ET consists on earnings before extra items in current year 
(wc01551); Size is the natural logarithm of firm’s total assets (wc02999); ROA is return on 
assets (wc08326); SG  is sales growth and it is computed by sales of current year to sales of 
previous year -1 (wc01001); SL is sales of current year per employee (wc01001 and wc07011).; 
DE is debt to Equity given by total debt to common equity (wc008231); ADR is a dummy which 
is one if firm has got an ADR list and zero otherwise (wc06110); Big4 is a dummy and it is one 1 
if auditing firm is one of the four biggest international and zero otherwise (wc07800); Law is a 
dummy which is one if the country origin is Common law and zero otherwise.  
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
**correlation is significant at the 0.10 level. 
 
2.2. Two subsamples to test FRQ financial determinant 
 
Our results show that debt to equity factor is not statistically relevant 
when we consider the financial variable alone or with all independent variable 
together (table 7 and 8). However, we have a huge standard deviation on this 
variable (table 3). Therefore, we decided two divided sample into two sets: high 
leveraged firms, which DE variable is bigger than 80% (this value is a little 
above of the sample average); and low leveraged firms otherwise. 
Then we test the second and the third hypotheses to investigate whether 
capital structure affects, or not, accounting information. We still use two issues 
to access FRQ: Absolute Value of Abnormal Accruals (AAA) and Earnings 
Persistence (EP). 
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As we can see from table 9 to 11 DE becomes statistically significant and 
in a 1% level for firms with higher debt to equity than the sample mean. Just in 
case of testing all variables with EP model DE was not significant. However, the 
effects produced on FRQ are still very small since DE coefficient is close to zero 
in all situations (table 12). 
Additionally, we find evidence that for firms with DE below 80% the 
capital structure was not statistically significant. This is a robust result since it 
doesn’t depend on the proxy used to FRQ and it doesn’t depend on the variables 
included in the models (table 9 to 12). 
 
Table 9: 
H02- Financial determinants of FRQ using AAA as dependent variable with 
two sub-samples (high leveraged where DE >80 and less leveraged where 
DE<80) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.  
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
  
  DE<80 DE>80   
Intercept 0.0558 * 0.0513 * 
 
(71.7431) 
 
(53.7242) 
 DE + -5.47E-08 2.53E-06 * 
(-0.1246) (3.3449) 
ADR - -0.0119 * -0.0174 * 
  
  (-5.4613)   (-7.5138)   
Number of 
obs. 8,017 4,634 
Adj. R-
squared   0.0084   0.0190   
Variables definitions are in table 7. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
Table 10: 
H02- Financial determinants of FRQ using EP as dependent variable with 
two sub-samples (high leveraged where DE >80 and less leveraged where 
DE<80) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
 
  
  DE<80   DE>80   
Intercept 0.0115 * 0.0143 * 
 
(7.7818) 
 
(12.2709) 
 ET + 0.6359 * 0.4529 * 
(73.1645) (32.6183) 
DE + -1.12E-07 
 
-1.59E-06** 
 (-0.1404) (-1.7834) 
ADR + 0.0001 0.0028 
  
  (0.0189)   (1.0137)   
Number of obs. 
 
7,873 
 
4,579 
 Adj. R-squared   0.4094   0.2029   
Variables definitions are in table 7. 
*correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
Table 11: 
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H07- All determinants of FRQ using AAA as dependent variable with two 
sub-samples (high leveraged where DE >80 and less leveraged where 
DE<80) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
 
  
  DE<80   DE>80   
Intercept 0.1223 * 0.1239 * 
(22.1460) (18.9117) 
Size - -0.0055 * -0.0054 * 
(-11.6366) (-10.2967) 
ROA - -0.0002 * 0.0000 
 
(-7.3598) 
 
(-0.3186) 
 SG - 0.0000 0.0046 * 
 
(-0.8691) 
 
(3.6858) 
 SL - 0.0000 * 0.0000 * 
(5.3048) (2.5517) 
DE + -1.47E-08 
 
2.24E-06 * 
(-0.0342) (2.8952) 
ADR - 0.0026 -0.0032 
 
(1.0459) 
 
(-1.1774) 
 BIG4 - -0.0028 -0.0061 * 
(-1.5682) (-2.8789) 
Law - 0.0044 * -0.0035 ** 
    (2.7868)   (-1.6275)   
Number of obs. 7,748 4,536 
Adj. R-squared 0.0386   0.0517   
Variables definitions are in table 8. 
*correlation is significant at the0.01 level. 
**correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12:  
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H03- All determinants of FRQ using EP as dependent variable with two 
sub-samples (high leveraged where DE >80 and less leveraged where 
DE<80) 
Independent  Predicted Coefficient Prob.   Coefficient Prob.   
Variables Sign (OLS t-statistic) (OLS t-statistic) 
  
  DE<80   DE>80   
Intercept -0.0328 * -0.0134 *** 
 
(-3.4772) 
 
(-1.6429) 
 ET + 0.6286 * 0.4505 * 
(54.9210) (29.0412) 
Size + 0.0026 * 0.0008 
 (3.2378) (1.2752) 
ROA + -0.0001 
 
-0.0001 ** 
(-1.0157) (-2.0830) 
SG + -0.0002 ** -0.0017 
 (-1.7990) (-1.1375) 
SL + 0.0000 ** 0.0000 * 
  
(1.7856) 
 
(3.0937) 
 DE + -9.62E-08 -7.76E-07 
 
(-0.1316) 
 
(-0.8344) 
 ADR + -0.0078 ** -0.0001 
(-1.8173) (-0.0335) 
BIG4 + 0.0073 * 0.0128 * 
(2.4296) (5.0575) 
Law + 0.0087 * 0.0066 * 
    (3.2736)   (2.5671)   
Number of Obs. 7,748 4,535 
Adj.d R-squared   0.3933   0.2093   
Variables definitions are in table 8. 
*correlation is significant at the0.01 level. 
**correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
 
Section 3: Conclusions 
 
We found evidence that economic performance affects Financial Report 
Quality (FRQ) in European Countries. 
Firm’s size is the most significant factor in defining financial information 
quality because, regardless of whether we use abnormal accruals or earnings 
persistence to access that quality, it is always statistically significant. The 
biggest firms exhibit the highest FRQ since there is a negative relation between 
size and abnormal accruals and there is a positive relation between size and 
earnings persistence. The biggest firms and with high ROA have several 
pressures to exhibit Financial Information with high quality. This also can mean 
that smallest firms have Financial Reports with poorer quality. They should be 
given special attention, namely specific regulation to assure good information in 
Financial Reports. 
The earnings reported in the current year are also an important factor in 
explaining FRQ. It was only included in one model (B), which more readily 
explains our FRQ proxy. In addition, the independent variables may explain 
FRQ better when we use EP rather than AA to estimate FRQ. 
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Of the other economic variables included, only sales growth is 
statistically significant at 10% level. Labour productivity is not consistent with 
this strong relation between economic factors and FRQ. 
The financial variables considered don’t have a significant effect under 
FRQ in European Countries: 
About capital structure the results obtained show us that it is not 
significant, both in abnormal accruals and in earnings persistence. This only 
becomes a significant factor when we consider all factors together with AAA as 
FRQ proxy. The sign is that expected: firms with heavy debt to equity tend to 
reduce FRQ. However, we found evidence that the relation between capital 
structure and FRQ is not linear since DE (Debt to Equity) becomes a FRQ 
determinant to those firms which are high leveraged. This is observable in the 
two models less in model B with all variables. The results for less leveraged 
firms confirmed that for those firms capital structure has no implications on 
FRQ. 
ADR statistical significances and signs are not consistent. Therefore we 
can not say that this is a relevant factor of FRQ. 
The last set of variables considered was related with firm’s control. The results 
we obtained shows that control variables affect FRQ of European firms. 
As in literature, we obtained that firms audited by one Big4 have more 
accurate Financial Reporting. This result is robust since it is obtained with the 
two FRQ proxies. Finally, Law was not very consistent but when it was 
statistically significant it produced the expected effect: countries with common 
law protect investors more by increasing FRQ and those countries are less 
represented in our sample. 
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